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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER BANK & TRUST, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BETTY JONES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
WALKER BANK & TRUST CO., 
Plaintiff /Respondent, 
vs. 
GLORIA HARLAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
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Case No. 18110 
Case No. 18111 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By : BRUCE PLENK 
637 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Appellants 
ROY WILLIAMS, ESQ. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH 
800 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER BANK & TRUST, 
Plaintiff /Respondent, 
vs. 
BETTY JONES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
WALKER BANK & TRUST CO., 
Plaintiff /Respondent, 
vs. 
GLORIA HARLAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
. 
. 
• .. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
• . 
• 
• 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 18110 
Case No. 18111 
= 
Defendants/Appellants Gloria Harlan and Betty Jones hereby 
petition this court, pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to rehear this cause on the following grounds: 
1. The majority opinion failed to properly defer to the 
expertise of the Federal Trade Commission of the administrative 
agencies delegated by Congress to enforce the Truth in Lending 
Act. 
2. The majority opinion failed to abide by the clear 
intent of Congress in placing the burden of risk of loss on card 
issuers rather than on card holders. 
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3. The majority opinion improperly characterizes the terms 
of the Cardholder Agreement and the law of apparent authority. 
""(') J1, DATED this ~ day of September, 1983. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
By: f >w~L (; /(,J. _ 
1 BRUCE PLENK 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Pe ti ti on for Rehearing, postage prepaid, to Roy 
Williams, Esq., Attorney for Respondent, at 800 Walker Building, 
2v~ (' ~ f__ I ,.,, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this J day of __ JY--+-p~~---·-------~--~' 
1983. 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover money for purchases made with 
credit cards issued by Respondent to Appellants. Appellants 
allege that their rights under the Federal Truth in Lending Act 
have been violated. The two cases involve nearly identical facts 
and the same "Cardholder Agreement". 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The District Court granted surrunary judgment to Plaintiff 
against each Defendant. This was affirmed by this Court in its 
opinion issued on September 8, 1983. 
RELIEF SOUGHT HEREIN 
Defendants/Appellants seek rehearing and reversal of this 
Court's decision of September 8, 1983. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of these cases are set out in Appellants' initial 
brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MAJORITY OPINION FAILED TO PROPERLY DEFER 
TO THE EXPERTISE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, ONE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES DELEGATED BY CONGRESS TO ENFORCE THE 
TRUTH IN LENDING ACT. 
Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have 
stated time and time again that in the interpretation of statutes 
great deference should be given to the construction of statutes 
made by the administrative agencies charged with enforcing those 
statutes. Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell 645 P.2d 
629 (Utah 1982); New York Dept of Social Services v. Dublino 413 
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U.S. 405 (1973). The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) provides that 
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has interpretive powers regarding 
banks while the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has similar powers 
regarding other credit card issuers. 15 U.S.C. §1607(a) and (c), 
The u. s. Supretj'ie Court has specifically stated that agency 
interpretation of TILA is disposi tive unless "demonstrably 
irrational" Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin 444 U.S. 555 
(1980). 
Yet given this analytical background, this court chose, in 
its majority opinion, to totally disregard the FTC analysis and 
order in In the Matter of Shell Oil Co. 95 F.T.C. 357 (1980). 
This case is the only post-TILA case which specifically addresses 
the issue in the present case, whether a previously authorized 
spouse's use of <a credit card can become unauthorized use by 
cardholder notice'.to the issuer. The FTC considered the analysis 
utilized by the majority and explicitly rejected it. 
Exhibits A and B are excerpted f rorn the public comment 
record maintained by the FTC to allow interested parties to 
comment on the proposed consent order which was eventually 
adopted in the Shell Oil case. Letters from various credit card 
issuers were received, all of whom took the position that either 
the card use once ~uthorized continued to be authorized until the 
account was closed, that apparent authority existed so long as 
the non-cardholder spouse had the credit card, or that the risk 
of loss should be on the cardholder not the issuer. Exhibit A is 
a representative letter from the president of the Consumer 
Bankers Association. Exhibit B is the official formal reply to 
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these arguments issued by the FTC in response. The key points of 
the response, to which this Court should defer, are that 
notification to the card issuer is sufficient to terminate 
apparent authority of the "errant" card user both with respect to 
the issuer and to merchants, that Congress has made a policy 
determination that the risk of loss in all situations, including 
revocation of previously authorized use, should be on the issuer, 
and that the FRB staff has concurred with the FTC analysis and 
conclusion in this matter. This analysis and response to the 
specific points raised by the majority opinion requires this 
Court rehear and reconsider its analysis, particularly since the 
primary case relied on by the majority, Martin v. American 
Express, Inc. 361 So 597 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978), is addressed by 
the FTC and rejected as not on point. 
POINT II 
THE MAJORITY OPINION FAILED TO ABIDE BY THE 
CLEAR INTENT OF CONGRESS TO PLACE THE BURDEN 
OF RISK OF LOSS ON CARD ISSUERS RATHER THAN 
ON CARD HOLDERS. 
There can be no question that Congress intended the card 
issuer to bear the risk of loss for unauthorized use of credit 
cards. This position had been articulated by the FTC in its 
analysis of TILA. See Exhibit B. Commentators have uniformly 
agreed that this policy choice was clearly demonstrated by 
Congress and, given the workings of the credit industry and the 
economics therein, such a policy choice is correct. See Note -
Consumer Protection - Credit Card Protection Under the Truth in 
Lending Act 49 N.C. L.Rev 775 (1971) and Weistart, Consumer 
Protection in the Credit Card Industry: Federal Legislative 
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Controls 70 Mich. L .. Rev. 1475 (1972). Given this legislative 
history it is inappropriate for this Court to revise, reverse, or 
second guess a clear policy decision of Congress. 
POINT III 
THE MAJORITY OPINION IMPROPERLY CHARACTERIZES 
THE TERMS OF THE CARDHOLDER AGREEMENT AND THE 
LAW OF APPARENT AUTHORITY. 
The majority opinion improperly characterizes the Cardholder 
Agreement. While either Appellant could have, in ·theory, 
returned "the cards" as required and terminated the Agreement, 
neither chose to do so. However Respondent bank, by virtue of 
the same paragraph 10 of the Agreement could have terminated t~ 
Agreement at any time, yet also chose not to do so. Since it was 
impossible for the cardholders to return all cards given the lack 
of knowledge of their husbands' whereabouts, this provision may 
well be unconscionable and unenforceable; it is certainly not 
good public policy and must fall when set up against clear 
Congressional intent. 
Likewise, the majority opinion mistakes the law regarding 
apparent authority. The FTC analysis found in Exhibit B 
establishes that notification to the issuer ends apparent 
authority as to both issuer and merchants. Weistart, supra, at 
1522 also points out that "appropriate action" taken by the 
cardholder could terminate the apparent authority. Here the 
notification was the necessary and appropriate action to end any 
apparent authority. Once the bank was notified apparent 
authority was ended as to the bank and its failure to take action 
to notify merchants should result in the loss being placed on the 
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issuer. 
In a similar context, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
recently held that an issuer was liable for unauthorized charges 
made on a company card until the company had passed up a 
reasonable opportunity to notify the issuer that the charges were 
in fact unauthorized. When no notice was received after that 
time, the company and its insurer became liable. Transamerica 
Insurance Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 325 N. W. 2d 210 (N.D~ 1982). 
Here, where notice was given, the issuer should be fully liable. 
The discussion in Transamerica regarding the end of apparent 
authority clearly points to reasonable action by the principal as 
necessary to avoid liability. Here such action was taken. After 
such notice the bank's failure to take reasonable steps to reduce 
any loss are another policy indicator that should explain the end 
of apparent authority. See Standard Oil Co. v. State Neon 
Company, Inc. 171 S. E. 2d 777 (Ga. App 1969) . 
. CONCLUSION 
Congress and the appropriate federal administrative agencies 
have established a clear policy regarding unauthorized use of 
credit cards and who should bear the risk of loss for such use. 
The majority opinion impermissibly ignored these policy 
determinations and held to the contrary by substituting a 
different policy judgment. Likewise the majority opinion in-
correctly analyzed agency law and the agreement between the 
cardholder and the bank. These actions are incorrect and should 
be remedied by granting rehearing to Appellants. 
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DATED this 
·-y11> 
~ 15 day of ~f (ri~,-- ' 1983. 
c=TAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellants in Support of Petition for Rehearing, ·postage 
prepaid, to Roy Williams, Esq. at Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough, Attorneys for Respondent, 800 Wal!cer Building, Salt 
r(CL / 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this ;;!, ~?day of ~£!-ZZ.r~ ,; 
/l 
1983. 
1l . I!!!!!!!! 
(./ 
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EXHIBIT A 
Office of the Secretary 
Federal Trade Commission 
6th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20580 
\..V."''JLl,\II;.I\ 
R 1\ ."-. K F R 'i 
:\ ~~OCI A TIO.~ 
Re: Shell Oil Company Consent Agreement--File #7923260 
Dear Ms. Secretary: 
The Consumer Bankers Association (CBA}, which represents 
the retail banking departments of over 335 commercial banks 
holding over 55% of the total consumer credit outstandings 
held by such institutions, submits the following conunents 
concerning the above-captioned consent order. as published 
in the Federal Register of November 5, 1979, 44 F.R. 63550. 
Although not under the jurisdiction of the Commission, the 
membership of CBA, as national credit card issuers, is 
greatly concerned over the proposed consent order. We be-
lieve the order is based on an incorrect interoretation of 
. ~ 
the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z and is fundamentally 
unfair to credit card issuers. 
The Analysis of the Proposed Consent Order to Aid ?ublic 
Conuncnt, 44 P.R. 63552, states the complaint focuses on 
instances where a cardholder at one time authorized the 
card's use by a third person (such as a spouse} but at a 
later date notified Shell that the formerly-permitted use was 
no longer authorized. In such situations, according to the 
Order, Shell violates §226.13{b) (2) of Regulation Z by refusing 
to terminate the liability of the cardholder inunediately 
after notification of unauthorized use in accordance with 
§226.13(e). 
Section 226.13(e) concerns the notification of the card 
issuer " ... with respect to loss, theft, or possible unauthorized 
use of any credit card .... " §226.13(b) (2} deals with the con-
ditions of liability for unauthorized use of a credit card. 
The term "unauthorized use," however, is defined only in the 
section on definitions and rules of construction, §226.2(ii) _ 
"Unauthorized use" means the use of a credit card by a person 
other than the cardholder (l} who does not have actual, 
' 
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implied, or apparent authority fo such use, and (2) }ram ., 
which the cardholdcr receives no b_ efit. This def' ition 
does not appear directly or by referenc n the 
Proposed Consent Agreement or accompanying Analysis~ For 
the provisions of §226.13(b) to be triggered, however, there 
must first be an "unauthorized use." CB.i\ believes that the 
practice in question does not come within this definition, 
According to §226.2(ii), an unauthorized user is one 
who does not have actual, implied, or apparent authority. 
Under the rules of Agency, apparent authority is "the power 
to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions 
with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising 
from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to surl--
third persons." Restatement of Agency 2d, § 8 (1958). Th 
cardholder, by prOVIding another user with his card, clea J 
manifests to third persons {merchants) that user's appare~ 
if not actual, authority to bind the cardholder. The indic. 
of the authority is the card itself. As long as the agent 
of the cardholder, in this case the spouse, continues to 
possess the card and present it to t~ird parties, apparent 
authority exists. 
It is the cardholder, or principal, who bears the burden 
of terY.linating the user's apparent authority. 
"Although the principal is entitled to have indicia 
of authority returned to him upon termination of the 
relation, if he is unsuccessful in accomplishing this 
the risk of the deception of third persons who have 
otherwise no notice of the terrrti!1ation rests upon 
the principal.'' Restateme nt of .;gency 2d, § 131 (1958). 
Giving notice to the card issuer of termination of a user's 
authority is not sufficient to terminate the user's apparent 
authority with respect to hundreds of thousands of merchants 
nationwide. 
The only reported case that addresses the issue presented 
by this order is Martin v. American Ex~ress, Inc., 361 So. 2d 
597 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978). In Martin, the cardholder had given 
his card to a business associate; McBride, with instructions 
not to charge over $500. Furthermore, Martin wrote to American 
Express asking that it limit total charges on his account to 
$1,000. The court correctly framed the issue in this case as 
whether ''unauthorized use" occurred when McBride exceeded the 
limits set by Martin. The court specifically decided this issue 
by stating: 
"We hold that in instances where a cardholder, who 
is under no compulsion by fraud, duress or otherwise, 
vo 1 u n ta r i 1 y p e rm i ts t he use o f his (or ~. :: r ~ c r 2 c i t 
card by another person, the cardholder has authorized 
the use of that card and is thereby reponsible for 
any char9es as a result of that use." Id at 599. 
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~D=·= ~·==-=~-- ~----~:~=---;~~ that McBride h:_1d appzirent authority 
·li-F"- "'"c'~ ·'"'"',,--._,___,. ~- ~--· -,~,.,,..n";>~,a the limits set by Martin and therefore 
the issuer, American Express, was not bound by the limitation 
set by Martin. In addressing the lirnitatiop proposal of 
Martin, the court stated: 
"Such a policy would place a difficult and potentially 
disastrous burden on the issuer. We know of no au-
thority which requires a card issuer to perform services 
of this nature and Martin has provided us with none." 
Id at 600. 
CBA fully concurs with the conclusion reached by the 
court; it would be almost impossible for many three-party 
credit card issuers to stop use of a card upon receipt of 
notification from the cardholder. While it may be possible to 
control card usage for large purchases requiring authorization, 
we doubt there is any feasible method to control numerous 
small transactions occurring nationwide or abroad. 
The issue in both the Martin case and in the proposed 
order is whether a user of a card retained apparent authority 
to use the card after notification of the card issuer. This 
issue has been specifically addressed by the staff of the 
Federal Reserve Board in Public Information Letter Number 
822, July 23, 1974, by then Chief of the Truth in Lending 
Section, Jerauld c. Kluckman. In that letter, the staff 
stated "if there is actual, implied or apparent authority 
under state law for such use of the credit card, it is the 
staff's opinion that the use cannot be unauthorized for purposes 
bf limited liability provisions of Section 226 .13 (c) • '' 
We concur with this interpretation by the staff of the agency 
charged by Congress with implementing the Act. 
Further, we believe that if the consent order is approved 
in its present form, the Conunission will be engaging in 
creating a federal common law. This concept has been explicit-
ly rejected by the Federal Reserve Board in drafting Regulation · 
Z. The Supreme Court has also rejected the notion of creating 
a body of federal common law, directing federal courts to 
rely on applicable state law. Butner v. United States, 440 
U.S. 48 (1979). See also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 
U.S. , 995 Ct:-1448 (1979). We strongly urge the 
CowmisSTon to not further complicate this area by creating a 
rule of law which is contrary to the position of the Federal 
Reserve Board, the United States Supreme Court, and the intent 
of Congress to apply state law tests to the issue of "authority" 
of credit card users. 
That the interpretation proposed in the consent order is 
an enlargement of both the Act and Regulatic~ ~an further be 
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.... 
P.L. 95-630 {1978). Section 90 :ed 
electronic fund transfer" as one initiated by a person 
other than the consumer without actual authority .•.. " 
(emphasis added}. This does not include (A) a transfer 
by a user who was furnished with the means of access to 
the consumer's account by the consumer, unless the consumer 
has notified the financial institution that transfers by 
such other person are no longer authorized. Here, Congress 
clearly stated that situations like the one at issue in the 
proposed order would be an "unauthorized use'' in the EFT 
area. Congress did not so state, and did not so intend, 
with regard to credit cards. 
Because of the overwhelming concern of the bankcard 
industry that the standard set by this order might be used 
to judge all creditors and will thus place an unwarranted 
and substantial burden on the industry, we believe the Federal 
Trade Commission should seek a formal Federal Reserve Board in 
terpretation on the issue presented. In order to expedite 
this consideration, The Consumer Bankers Association is 
in the process of preparing a petition to the Federal Reserve 
Board requesting a formal Board interpretation. We urge 
the Conunission to suspend any further consideration of this 
consent order at this time and join us in seeking a Board 
interpretation. 
If the Commission feels that it is unable to accommodate 
this request, we ask that the order be amended to clarify 
the fact that this order is applicable only to Shell Oil 
Company and should not be considered as a standard to be 
followed by the credit industry. We believe that such a 
disclaimer would assure that no court or other agency would 
be misled, construing this order as an industry standard. 
The Consumer Bankers Association appreciates the oppor-
tunity to comment on this consent order and looks forward 
to hearing from your staff as to the suggestions proposed 
in this comment. 
Since~ely, 
- ,. .... · I... (:_7 .1.) ~ 
I ~ _;.· 4 ;!/, ·': ,- :)t ' 1" 
- J~~~ _/ ~ "'--- , 
Leslie R. Butler 
President 
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, 
:?i::DERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20580 
Mr. Leslie R. Butler, President 
The Consumer Bankers Association 
1725 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
EXHIBI'I' B 
Re: Shell Oil Company 
File No.: 792-3260 
Thank you for your recent letter commenting on the 
Federal Trade Commission's consent order in the Shell Oil 
proceeding. Your letter was placed on the public record 
pursuant to Section 2.34 of the Commission's Rules and 
was given serious consideration. After carefully evaluating 
all the comments received, including yours, the Commission 
has decided to issue the order contained in the agreement. 
The following is a reply to the points you raised in your 
letter. 
With respect to the definition of •unauthorized use" 
in Regulation Z, the Commission believes that previously-
, authorized use by a third person becomes •unauthorized" 
when the cardholder revokes the authorization and so 
notifies the card issuer. This position is consistent 
with the definition of •unauthorized use" because the third 
person no longer has apparent authority to use· the card 
after notification of revocation. Notification to the 
card issuer is sufficient, not only to terminate the third-
person' s apparent authority with respect to the card issuer, 
but also with respect to merchants that are the agents 
of the issuer in the use and acceptance of the issuer's 
credit ~ards. This position is consistent with the statutory 
theory of Regulation z, as shown by !226.13(e), that 
notice to the issuer is also notice to the issuer's agents 
for purposes of the safeguards set forth in 8226.13. 
The case of Martin v American Express, Inc., 361 So. 
2d 597 (Ala. Civ. App. 1918), cited in your cotairuent, involved 
a different factual situation from the facts alleged in 
the Shell complaint. In Martin there was not an absolute 
revocation but instead an attempt by the cardholder to 
set a maximum limit on the holder's liability for third-
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party use. Without either implying concurrence or disagreemeri 
with the Martin holding, the Cormnission notes that the 
facts in that case are different from the unconditional 
and complete revocation as alleged in Shell. 
Your letter states that this order, if generally followed 
in the credit card industry, would place too great a burden 
on the credit card issuer as opposed to the cardholder. 
Congress through the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation 
z has made a public policy determination that, after notificat 
to the issuer of loss, theft, or other unauthorized use, 
the risk of loss for the third-party use is placed on the 
issuer. After notification it is the responsibility of 
the issuer to take whatever steps it deems appropriate 
to minimize or eliminate any loss. As shown by this order, 
The Conunission interprets Regulation Z to place this burden 
after notification on the credit card company rather than 
on the cardholder regardless of whether the unauthorized 
use was a result of loss, theft, or revocation of previously-
authorized use. 
It is in the public interest that the cardholder be 
relieved of liability for third-party use after notification 
to the issuer of revocation of previously-authorized use 
rather than to continue to hold the card.holder liable until 
the card is returned to the issuer. In many instances, 
as with lost or stolen cards, it may be impractical or 
impossible for the holder to retrieve the card and return 
it to the issuer, and continuing to hold the cardholder 
liable would subject the holder to possibly unlimited charges 
by the third person that the holder is powerless to control. 
The card issuer, on the other hand, can protect itself 
through merchant notification and other loss-prevention 
measures. Further, the order specifically does not aid 
the cardholder if the cardholder has committed fraud or 
received benefit from the third-person use, thus protecting 
the card issuer from unscrupulous holders. Finally, nothing . 
in this order prohibits the issuer from attempting to hold 
the third party liable for these charges. 
Finally, you suggest that consideration of this order 
be deferred until a formal Federal Reserve Board interpretatior 
can be obtained. However, this matter was referred to 
the CoITUnission from the Board staff, and the Commission 
has been informed by Board staff that the Commission's 
legal interpretations of this matter is correct. Thus, 
the Conunission believes that nothing would be gained by 
such a delay for formal interpretation. 
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You[ other points raised in your comment have been 
considered. However, for the reasons stated in this letter', 
the Commission believes this order is appropriate and is 
based upon a correct interpretation of Regulation z. 
In sum, the Commission has decided that it is in the 
public interest to issue the agreed-upon order. 
Your interest in bringing your comments to the attention 
of the Commission is appreciated. 
By direction of the Commission. 
Carol M. Thomas 
Secretary 
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